track_shipment

track_shipment returns shipment tracking for an order. Like order_status, it is customer-scoped: Sill sends customer_email as a required argument, and your handler MUST verify that email belongs to the order before returning any data.

Customer scoping — your responsibility

Sill cannot enforce this for you. Only your customer database knows which email owns which order.

Correct

Request: { order_id: "#1001", customer_email: "[email protected]" }

Handler:
  1. Look up order #1001.
  2. Compare its customer email (in constant time) to "[email protected]".
  3. If they match → look up the shipment and return the canonical result.
  4. If they don't match, or order does not exist → return HTTP 404 with an empty body.

Wrong

Request: { order_id: "#1001", customer_email: "[email protected]" }

Handler (missing the check):
  1. Look up order #1001.
  2. Return its tracking data.  ← BUG: attacker can now enumerate any tracking chain.

The wrong pattern leaks a tracking chain (carrier, tracking number, expected delivery) to any caller who guesses an order number. Refuse it.

The check

Compare the email argument to your stored customer email in constant time, lowercased and NFKC-normalized on both sides. In Node.js:

import { timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';

function emailsMatch(a: string, b: string): boolean {
  const na = a.trim().toLowerCase().normalize('NFKC');
  const nb = b.trim().toLowerCase().normalize('NFKC');
  const ba = Buffer.from(na, 'utf8');
  const bb = Buffer.from(nb, 'utf8');
  if (ba.length !== bb.length) return false;
  return timingSafeEqual(ba, bb);
}

If the emails do not match, respond HTTP 404 with an empty body. Do NOT distinguish “order not found” from “wrong customer”.

A 404 is a normal, expected response — it is treated as a clean “not found” and returned to the agent as such. It does not count against your endpoint’s health. Reserve non-404 error statuses (5xx, timeouts) for genuine failures.

Request

Machine-readable: /skills/v1/track_shipment.request.schema.json

Field	Type	Required	Notes
`order_id`	string	yes	1–128 chars.
`customer_email`	string	yes	3–320 chars.

{
  "additionalProperties": false,
  "properties": {
    "customer_email": {
      "maxLength": 320,
      "minLength": 3,
      "type": "string"
    },
    "order_id": {
      "maxLength": 128,
      "minLength": 1,
      "type": "string"
    }
  },
  "required": ["order_id", "customer_email"],
  "type": "object"
}

Example request

{
  "skill_id": "track_shipment",
  "site_id": "01EXAMPLE00000000000000000",
  "arguments": {
    "order_id": "#1001",
    "customer_email": "[email protected]"
  },
  "observed_at": "2026-07-05T18:22:15.140Z",
  "nonce": "01K1EXAMPLE0000000000000000"
}

Response

Machine-readable: /skills/v1/track_shipment.response.schema.json

Only order_id is required. Every other field is optional so you can honestly represent “the order exists but nothing has shipped yet” as { "order_id": "#1001" }.

Field	Type	Required	Notes
`order_id`	string	yes	Echo the order id. 1–256 chars.
`tracking_number`	string	no	Carrier-issued tracking number. 1–256 chars.
`carrier`	string	no	Carrier name / code. 1–256 chars.
`status`	string	no	Free-form status. 1–64 chars. `not_yet_shipped`, `in_transit`, `delivered`, `pending`, `cancelled`, or a carrier-specific string.
`expected_delivery`	string	no	ISO-8601 UTC. 20–40 chars.
`tracking_url`	string	no	HTTPS URL to the carrier’s tracking page. 1–2048 chars.

Do NOT include the customer name, shipping address, phone, or other customer-scoped detail — additionalProperties: false rejects them as malformed_response. Minimum disclosure by construction.

{
  "additionalProperties": false,
  "properties": {
    "carrier": { "maxLength": 256, "minLength": 1, "type": "string" },
    "expected_delivery": { "maxLength": 40, "minLength": 20, "type": "string" },
    "order_id": { "maxLength": 256, "minLength": 1, "type": "string" },
    "status": { "maxLength": 64, "minLength": 1, "type": "string" },
    "tracking_number": { "maxLength": 256, "minLength": 1, "type": "string" },
    "tracking_url": { "maxLength": 2048, "minLength": 1, "type": "string" }
  },
  "required": ["order_id"],
  "type": "object"
}

Example response — shipment in transit

{
  "order_id": "#1001",
  "tracking_number": "1Z999AA10123456784",
  "carrier": "UPS",
  "status": "in_transit",
  "expected_delivery": "2026-07-08T00:00:00.000Z",
  "tracking_url": "https://www.ups.com/track?tracknum=1Z999AA10123456784"
}

Example response — not yet shipped

{
  "order_id": "#1001",
  "status": "not_yet_shipped"
}

Not-found response

For any of these conditions, return HTTP 404 with an empty body:

Order does not exist.
Email does not match the order’s stored customer email.

Do NOT return a canonical response with a fabricated status — that leaks the existence of an order id you refused to reveal.

What Sill checks

Extra fields are rejected. additionalProperties: false — no shipping_address, no customer_name.
Bounds. tracking_url up to 2048 chars; status up to 64.

Verifying Sill’s signature

Every request Sill POSTs to your endpoint carries a X-Sill-Signature: t=<unix>,v1=<hex> header, where <hex> is HMAC-SHA256("<t>.<raw-body>") with your shared secret.

TypeScript (compact)

import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';

export function verify(header: string, body: string, secret: string): boolean {
  const map = Object.fromEntries(header.split(',').map((p) => p.split('=', 2)));
  const t = Number(map.t);
  const sig = String(map.v1 ?? '');
  if (!Number.isFinite(t) || sig.length === 0) return false;
  if (Math.abs(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) - t) > 300) return false;
  const expected = createHmac('sha256', secret).update(`${t}.${body}`).digest();
  const got = Buffer.from(sig, 'hex');
  if (expected.length !== got.length) return false;
  return timingSafeEqual(expected, got);
}

Python (compact)

import hmac, hashlib, time

def verify(header: str, body: bytes, secret: bytes) -> bool:
    parts = dict(p.split('=', 1) for p in header.split(',') if '=' in p)
    try:
        t = int(parts['t'])
    except (KeyError, ValueError):
        return False
    sig = parts.get('v1', '')
    if abs(int(time.time()) - t) > 300 or not sig:
        return False
    expected = hmac.new(secret, f'{t}.'.encode() + body, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
    return hmac.compare_digest(expected, sig)

Go (compact)

func Verify(header string, body []byte, secret []byte) bool {
    var t int64 = -1
    var sig string
    for _, p := range strings.Split(header, ",") {
        kv := strings.SplitN(p, "=", 2)
        if len(kv) != 2 { continue }
        switch kv[0] {
        case "t":
            n, err := strconv.ParseInt(kv[1], 10, 64)
            if err != nil { return false }
            t = n
        case "v1":
            sig = kv[1]
        }
    }
    if t < 0 || sig == "" { return false }
    diff := time.Now().Unix() - t
    if diff < 0 { diff = -diff }
    if diff > 300 { return false }
    mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, secret)
    mac.Write([]byte(strconv.FormatInt(t, 10) + "."))
    mac.Write(body)
    got, err := hex.DecodeString(sig)
    if err != nil { return false }
    return hmac.Equal(mac.Sum(nil), got)
}